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Abstract
Encouraging users to create stronger passwords is
one of the key issues in password-based authentication.
It is particularly important as prior works have highlighted that most passwords are weak. Yet, passwords
are still the most commonly used authentication method.
This paper seeks to mitigate the issue of weak passwords by proposing a context-based password strength
meter. We conduct a randomized experiment on Amazon MTurk and observe the change in users’ behavior.
The results show that our proposed method is significantly effective. Users exposed to our password strength
meter are more likely to change their passwords after
seeing the warning message, and those new passwords
are stronger. Furthermore, users are willing to invest
their time to learn about creating a stronger password,
even in a traditional password strength meter setting.
Our findings suggest that simply incorporating contextual information to password strength meters could be
an effective method in promoting more secure behaviors
among end users.

1.

Introduction

Passwords have been an essential user authentication
method for years despite the availability of stronger authentication mechanisms [1]. However, there is one major dilemma associated with password-based authentication. That is, a password must be easy for the owner
to remember but it must be hard for others to guess.
Naturally, many users prefer memorability over security,
choosing weak passwords. According to a survey conducted by TeleSign in 2015 [2], 3 out of 4 users chose
weak passwords, and 40 percent of them experienced an
issue with their account security in the past year.
One popular approach to mitigate the issue of weak
passwords is to create a visual feedback in the password
generation process through a “password strength meter”.
The meter calculates password strength using an algorithm, and displays the strength information to the user.
Previous works in this area have focused on improving
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the underlying algorithm by seeking to find the better
(faster or more accurate) ways to calculate password
strength [3, 4]. Yet, little research has been conducted
to understand how users perceive password strength meters and the implication of the meters’ component, particularly the warning message, despite the fact that most
users do not understand the implication of warning messages due to their limited technical background (e.g.,
what does “weak” password really mean?). This lack of
understanding could significantly impact the effectiveness of password strength meters.
In this study, we draw from theories in psychology, human-computer interaction, and warning sciences
to develop a theoretical foundation of how password
strength meter works. We consider password strength
meters to be an interactive warning and adopt the
Communication-Human Information Processing Model
(C-HIP) [5] as a framework to explain why traditional
password strength meters are ineffective. We hypothesize that incorporating contextual information into warning messages could draw users’ attention, positively affect their understandings and beliefs, and act as a stimulus to nudge their password generating behavior. Hence,
the context-based password strength meter would be
more effective in nudging users to think more about their
passwords, and promoting their secure behaviors.
We test our hypotheses by analyzing data from a human subject study conducted on Amazon Mechanical
Turk. We introduce hypothetical situations where participants are required to create an online account in different scenarios. We examine the effects of three experimental treatments (different context-based warning
messages) on the effectiveness of the password strength
meter. More specifically, we evaluate the password
strength, how often a user changes her password immediately after seeing the warning message, and how
often a user wants to learn more about how to create
stronger passwords. We find that the context-based password meter enhances password security. It nudges users
to change the password more often, and the new passwords they pick are stronger. We also find that incorpo-
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rating a link that points to learning more about how to
create a stronger password is effective even for the traditional password strength meter. Our findings suggest
that incorporating contextual information into password
strength meters’ warning message could be one effective method to promote more secure behaviors among
end users.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In
Section 2, we discuss related work and develop our hypotheses. We then describe the design of our study and
the methodology of our human subject study in Section
3. In Section 4, we present our analysis. Finally, we
discuss our results and conclude our study in Section 5.

2.

Conceptual Background

In this section, we first describe previous works related to password security, password strength meters,
users’ perception of warning messages and warning
models, and contextual information. Following that, we
develop our main hypotheses.
One line of research on password security studies
the property of the passwords. In general, it is found
that end users tend to choose passwords that are easy
to remember but also easy to guess. It has been suggested that organizations should use tools, such as password validation software, to mitigate this issue [1, 7]. It
has been argued that users could be motivated to adopt
secure behavior through well-planned security mechanisms or punishment threats [6]. Another line of research investigated users’ password creation behavior
when facing different stimuli such as password policy
designs [8], and training techniques [9]. This paper follows this line by investigating password meter designs
that could affect users’ password generating behavior.

2.1

Password Strength Meters

The concept of password strength meters has been
discussed in the literature for decades [11]. It has been
shown to be effective in leading users to create stronger
passwords [12, 13]. However, the design and implementation of these meters are usually ad-hoc, and operate like a black-box (i.e., without explanations or justifications of design choices) [14]. Hence, the password
strength meters on most websites are found to be inconsistent [15], which are confusing and may weaken the
purpose of the password strength meter itself.
Most research works that aim to enhance the effectiveness of password strength meters have focused on
the algorithm. It has been recognized that password
strength meters are less accurate than entropy measurement of an ideal case [16, 17]. And many techniques

have been proposed to overcome this limitation, including the use of probabilistic context-free grammars
[3, 18], and Markov model [19, 4]. However, despite
the advancement in developing algorithms, relative little
research has been done to investigate how password meters interact with human users. We consider password
strength meters as a form of warning and adopt models
and theories from the warning science literature, which
is reviewed next.

2.2

Warning Models

The warning science literature has identified two critical factors of warning, “hazard matching”, and “arousal
strength” [20]. The first term refers to the ability of a
warning message to convey potential risks to users. If
the message cannot convince a user regarding the level
of risks involved, she may choose to ignore it. Meanwhile, the latter term refers to how users perceive the
urgency of the warning [21]. If the warning message is
perceived to be nonessential, then the user may choose
to ignore it as well.
In this paper, we adopt the Communication-Human
Information Processing (C-HIP) Model, which has been
adopted for identifying potential reasons of warning ineffectiveness by several prior works [20, 22, 23]. The
full model description is shown in Figure 1.
The C-HIP model consists of nine phases. It begins
when a source delivers a warning message to a receiver
through a channel and ends with a change of receiver’s
behavior. At the time a receiver receives the warning
message, she would also receive other environmental
stimuli, which might distract her from paying attention
to the warning. The essential phases of this model for
our study are within the information processing phases,
which start after the receiver receives the warning message. As these phases are recognized and processed by
each receiver, they essentially determine the effectiveness of the warning (i.e., whether the warning results in a
change of a receiver’s behavior or not). In this paper, we
adopt a practice used by literature in human-computer
interaction, which suggests to use a set of questions to
evaluate the effectiveness of the warning in each phase
[20, 24].
First, we start at the Attention Switch phase and the
Attention Maintenance phase, which correspond to the
question “Do users notice the indicators?” Although
indicators of password strength meters are found to be
inconsistent across websites, they are generally welldesigned to sufficiently catch users’ attention [14]. In
addition, previous works have shown that they are generally recognized among end users [25]. Therefore, attention switch is unlikely to be a significant factor that con-
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Figure 1: Diagram of the C-HIP model

tributes to the ineffectiveness of password strength meters. The next phase is Comprehension/Memory, which
corresponds to the question “Do users know what the indicators mean?” To the best of our knowledge, there is
no previous research that looks into this specific question in the context of password strength meters. However, empirical evidences have shown that end users
are unaware of information security issues in general
[26, 27]. Furthermore, end-users often do not recognize
the issue of weak passwords [1]. In addition, a previous study in warning science has concluded that novice
users usually make mistake in terms of warning recognition, such as considering the wrong variables, missing
some variables, or considering the right variables but in
the wrong order [28]. Therefore, it can be inferred that
not understanding the warning messages could be one of
the factors that lead to password strength meters’ ineffectiveness. This lack of understanding could also lead
to the ineffectiveness of other phases down the line. For
instance, with a lack of understanding, users might not
believe the warning in the Attention/Beliefs phase and
thus have no motivation to change their behavior in the
Motivation phase.

2.3

Contextual Information

The practice of using contextual information to remedy lack of understanding is common in the literature
[29, 30, 31]. Vance et al. find that incorporating “fear appeals”, which could be considered as one type of contextual information, can increase final password strengths
[32]. However, that paper only investigates the changes
in final password strength, which could be a misleading dependent variable as described later. Our work is
significantly different from theirs as we seek to examine
the changes in password meters’ effectiveness with three
different measurements along with other contextual in-

formation.
In the context of warning design, the use of contextual information is outline by Wogalter et al. [33]. In
addition, Bauer et al. [28, 34] proposes that relevant
contextual information should be presented in warning
design as they observe that users tend to ignore warning messages as they do not understand them. Base on
these guidelines, we predict that adding contextual information to password strength meters would enhance
users’ understanding in the warning messages, resulting in more effective Comprehension/Memory phase in
the C-HIP model, and leading to improved security in
users’ behaviors. Desired behaviors of users who are
exposed to password strength meters include changing
their passwords and selecting stronger passwords. We
also anticipate that users who are exposed to contextual
information would want to seek additional information
regarding password security, if available. Therefore, we
hypothesize the following:
Hypothesis 1a Participants in the context-based warning message treatment choose a stronger password than
their original password after seeing the warning.
Hypothesis 1b New passwords chosen by participants
in the context-based warning message treatment are
stronger than those chosen by participants in the control group.
Hypothesis 2a Participants in the context-based warning message treatment change their passwords after seeing the warning.
Hypothesis 2b Participants in the context-based warning message treatment are more likely to change their
passwords compared to those in the control group.
Hypothesis 3a Participants in the context-based warning message treatment try to seek additional information
regarding how to create a stronger password after seeing the warning.
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Hypothesis 3b Participants in the context-based warning message treatment are more likely to seek additional
information compared to those in the control group.

3.

Methodology

To test our hypotheses, we conduct a human subject study on Amazon Mechanical Turk involving hypothetical situations where users need to create an online
account. Participants are informed of the experimental study and asked for their consent to participate. By
agreeing, participants allow researchers to collect and
analyze their passwords in unencrypted, but anonymized
manner.

3.1

Dependent Variable

There are three dependent variables that our study
seeks to investigate. First, the increase in strength of
passwords generated. Second, the number of occasions participants change their passwords after seeing
the password strength meter. Third, the number of occasions participants invest their time to learn how to create
strong passwords.
The increase in password strength is a common dependent variable in password studies. It represents the
ultimate goal of password strength meters, which is to
encourage a user to change his or her password and
pick a password that is stronger than the original one.
In our study, the strength of passwords is measured using the Backoff Markov Model with end symbol normalization proposed in [4]. The model is trained with
the RockYou dataset, which contains over 32 million
passwords leaked from the social application site Rockyou in December 2009. In the model, we only maintain substrings with frequency no less than 1,000 and
drop the ones appear less than 1,000 times (meaning
the frequency threshold is set to be 1,000). We then assign a strength label for each password as the following.
We label a password as Weak if when it is the among
the 300, 000 most frequent passwords according to the
model. This means that if an attacker tries passwords
following a descending order of the probability generated by the model, the account will be compromised in
300,000 attempts. We label a password as Medium if it
is among the top 5,000,000 passwords but not in the top
300,000. If the probability of a password is not in the
top 5,000,000, we label the password as Strong.
Second, we are interested in how password strength
meters affect the number of occasions where users
change their password after seeing the warning message. This variable is usually overlooked in password
strength meter studies. However, without fully under-

standing the effect of password meters on this variable,
the interpretation of the final password strength, which
is commonly used as a dependent variable in many password strength meter studies, could be missing important
information. For instance, suppose there are two users.
Users A initially picked a strong password and never
changes it. Meanwhile, users B initially picked a weak
password but changes to a strong one after seeing a password strength assessment. If the strength of the final
password is the only measurement (as commonly used
in previous password strength meter studies), we would
not be able to distinguish these two users and hence treat
them as the same group of users (e.g., users with a strong
password) in the analysis. Our study provides additional
insights in that regard.
Third, as we present contextual information to participants, we anticipate that they might be involved as they
understand more about the passwords they use. As a result, they might be willing to invest their time to learn
more about how to create a strong password, which will
help them improve security in the future. Therefore,
together with the strength of the password, we present
a link at the bottom of the password meter labeling as
“Tips towards strong passwords”. We are interested in
the number of occasions participants click this link as
it presents an opportunity to educate users regarding
how to create stronger passwords and promote security
awareness among them. To the best of our knowledge,
Our study is the first that investigates the effectiveness
of a password strength meters as a tool to educate users
and promote security awareness.

3.2

Experimental Design

At the beginning of the experiment, each participant
is randomly presented with one of the following scenarios: Bank, Restaurant, and Forum. Following that, the
participant is asked to create an online account corresponding to her scenario. Bank is a scenario where users
have to store both financial information and personal information in the account. Meanwhile, she needs to store
only a part of her personal information (e.g., name and
delivery address) in Restaurant and only her email in
Forum.
Next, the participant is asked to create a password for
her account. The interface of the password input form is
in Figure 2. Once the participant finishes typing a password, we calculate the strength of the password. The
password strength meter then displays a warning message to the right of the password input form. The system
randomly assigns one of four experimental treatments:
Control, Time, Rank, or Probability. They correspond to
the type of warning messages displayed with the pass-
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word strength meter. Note that we impose a password
length requirement of at least six characters for all treatments. No other requirements (e.g., policies such as using both letters and digits) are imposed.
In thecontrol treatment, users receive a warning message that contains only the labels derived from calculated strength of the passwords they pick (e.g., Weak,
Medium, or Strong). It is a standard practice in many
major websites [15].

Figure 2: The Interface of Password Generation

In the time treatment, users receive a warning message that contains the strength of the password they pick,
along with the time that a hypothetical hacker could use
to crack that password. We calculate the estimated time
to crack by assessing the time needed if an attacker continuously attacking the account by trying the most popular passwords first. We assume the attacker can try 100
passwords per second, which is a conservative assumption considering that it could be much faster in a realworld scenario [35]. An example of this warning message is: “Weak. We estimate that it takes 10 seconds to
crack your password, assuming that the attacker can try
100 passwords every second.”.
In the rank treatment, users receive a warning message that contains the strength and the rank of the
password. We calculate the rank as the following.
First, we generate a list of passwords using the Backoff
Markov Model trained on an existing password dataset.
The passwords are generated in descending order of
the probability. Therefore, in the generation process,
weaker passwords (i.e., those with higher probability)
are output earlier. The rank of passwords chosen by participants are estimated based on the list of passwords
generated. Specifically, we pick passwords of the ranks
that have only one significant digit (e.g., 10, 20, ...,
100, 200, ...) from this list and calculate their corresponding probability, resulting in rank-probability pair
for each one. Then, once a participant enters a password, we calculate the probability of the password using the same password model, and match the probability
with the closest rank-probability pair generated earlier.
Thus, The rank of the password is estimated as the highest rank whose corresponding probability is smaller than
the probability of the chosen password. In this way, we
essentially round up the actual rank of the password and

display one significant digit. For example, if the rank
of a password is 24,321, we show: “Weak. We estimate
that the password you chose is among the 30,000 weakest passwords”.
In the probability treatment, users receive a warning message that contains the strength of the password
along with an estimated number of accounts that use the
same password if there are 10 billion accounts globally.
The estimated value is calculated by the probability of
the password generated by the Backoff Markov Model
multiplies by 10 billion. For example, if the probability
calculate by the model is 0.001, we show: “Weak. We
estimate that about 10,000,000 other accounts will have
the same password as you within 10 billion accounts”.
In all treatments, we first calculate the probability
of passwords utilizing the Backoff Markov Model when
the webpage is loaded. Then, the strength of the passwords and the context-based warning message are generated and shown when the active cursor in the input
box becomes inactive. Specifically, we listen to the
event “focusout” of the password input field. Once an
event is triggered, the script estimating and displaying
the strength of passwords is executed. Note that the
model is implemented in Javascript and all necessary
data are transmitted to users’ browser by AJAX calls.
Hence, there is no communication between the browser
and our server until the passwords are finally submitted.
Lastly, below the warning message, we include a
clickable link with a caption “Tips towards strong password”. The password generation tips are displayed to
the user when the link is clicked. (We obtain password
generation tips from http://windows.microsoft.com/enus/windows-vista/tips-for-creating-a-strong-password.)
Note that we record the entire history of passwords
generated on the webpage. All user interactions,
including the timestamp of each event that shows when
the event occurs, are recorded as well.
Once the users finish creating their passwords for
their hypothetical account, we conduct a post-test survey
to address one of the major concerns in password generation studies. That is, the password that users generated
in the experiment might not be usable [36]. For example, participants might generate a random password that
they do not intend to remember. To alleviate such as
issue, we ask participants to complete a survey regarding their password generation strategy after they submit
their passwords. The survey is about how users generate
their passwords in general (not only the password they
just created for this study). It takes about 30-60 minutes
to complete the survey. After users finish answering the
survey, we ask them to re-enter the password they created for their account. Participants who fail to recall
the previously generated password after three attempts
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are excluded from our analysis. Following that, we ask
users to answer demographic questions including age,
gender, and education level, for the purpose of statistical controls.

3.3

Data Collection

We first conducted a pilot test involving 10 participants. The primary purpose of the pilot test is to ensure
that our system works as intended. We also collected
and analyzed the data to evaluate our experimental design. Some texts displayed were updated as necessary.
We also started recording the entry history of passwords
in the password generation process.
Our primary sample consists of 500 participants.
None of them fails the post-test password recall check.
Participants are compensated $0.75 after they complete
the experiment. We limit the age of participants to be
no less than 18.74 of the 500 participants are from 18 to
22; 202 of them are from 23 to 30; 133 of them are from
31 to 40; 64 of them are from 41 to 50; 25 of them are
older than 51 and the remaining 2 refuse to disclose their
age. For the 497 participants who disclose their gender,
283 of them are male and 214 are female. Regarding the
education level, the majority of them either have some
college credit (no degree) or bachelor’s degree. These
two categories account for 192 and 205 participants, respectively. For the rest of the participants, 41 have high
school diploma, 47 have a master’s degree, 8 have a professional degree, 6 have a doctoral degree, and 3 refuse
to reveal their education level.

4.

Analysis

In this section, we present the results of our experiment. We first use the regression analysis to examine
the effect of our control variables, which are age, gender,
and education level, on the dependent variables. We find
that none of them are significantly correlated with our
DVs, which are the increase in password strength, the
number of occasions users change their password, and
the number of occasions users click “Tips towards strong
password”. That is, these control variables explain the
variance of our dependent variables only marginally and
none of them is statistical significant at p < 0.10.
Next, we present our main results. Note that among
500 participants, 116 are assigned to the control group,
133 are in time treatment, 131 are in rank, and 120 are
in probability. As per the scenario assignment, 180 are
in bank, 166 are in restaurant, and 150 are in forum.
The details of the treatment/scenario assignment are presented in Table 1.

Table 1: Total number of participants in each
treatment/scenario

Bank
Restaurant
Forum
Total

4.1

Time
41
51
41
133

Rank
55
36
40
131

Probability
47
43
30
120

Control
41
36
39
116

Total
184
166
150
500

Password Strength

We begin with an analysis of the password strength.
We leverage the Probability Threshold Graph proposed
in [4]. Each line on the graph represents the guessibility of a password dataset calculated based a password
model (the Backoff Markov Model in our study.) A
point (x,y) on a line means that y percent of passwords
in the dataset have the probability of at least 2−x . For the
purpose of comparing the strength of password datasets,
we fix the x value, which is − log2 prob, where prob is
the probability assigned to a password by the password
model, and compare y values of different curves. A
higher y value indicates the password dataset is weaker
because it means that more passwords can be cracked
if passwords with less than the probability prob are attempted.
The graph represents the strength of passwords generated by participants given different scenarios is illustrated in Figure 3. We display the curve of each scenario
as well as two curves generated from two existing leaked
password datasets. The PhpBB dataset includes about
250,000 passwords leaked from Phpbb.com in January
2009. The Yahoo dataset includes around 450,000 passwords published in July 2012. It is clear that passwords
generated in our study are much stronger than those in
the Yahoo and PhpBB datasets. We believe such a phenomenon results from 1) users in general are more aware
of password security compared to users 3 years ago 2)
participants in MTurk are more involved in the digital
world and thus have more knowledge about cyber security. Among 3 scenarios, the final strength of passwords
created for online banks dominates, indicating that people tend to be more careful when facing financial or
monetary related situations. However, none of the differences of final password strengths among 3 scenarios
and 4 treatments is statistically significant.
Next, we investigate the increase in password
strength rather than the final password strength. Note
that the distribution of the password strength is highly
skewed by nature. Therefore, we follow previous works
in the literature by applying the natural logarithms to
the password strength [32]. The average increase of
log password strength in different scenarios and types
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Figure 3: The strength of passwords generated by participants given different scenarios

of contextual information is shown in Table 2. Overall, context-based password meters outperform the traditional password meter in terms of password strength
increase. Interestingly, users under the Forum scenario
(where users do not have to store any personal information) have the highest average increase in password
strength compare to other two scenarios where some
personal information and financial information are involved. This behavior could be explained through the
initial password strength as the strength of initial passwords in Forum are far weaker than those in Restaurant
and Bank. In addition, we also observe that a few users
change their passwords to weaker ones after they see the
password strength meters.

and control group is statistically significant. The results indicate that the difference is significant (F =
3.5234, p = 0.0075). However, our pairwise comparison (using Tukey HSD Test) reveals that even though
the average increase in password strength of all 3 types
of contextual information are higher than the control
one, only the difference of Rank is statistically significant (t = 3.18, p = 0.004). Hence, Hypothesis 1b is partially supported. It is also worth noting that the password
strength increase in Rank treatment significantly outweighs that of other experimental treatments, followed
by the Probability treatment while the Time treatment
performs the worst.

4.2
Table 2: The average increase of password strength
score (calculated by the Backoff Markov Model)
under different scenarios and contextual warning
messages

Bank
Restaurant
Forum
Total

Time
0.0277
0.0353
0.0510
0.0378

Rank
0.0373
0.1082
0.1664
0.0962

Probability
0.0269
0.0501
0.0718
0.0465

Control
-0.0439
0.0410
0.0243
0.0054

Total
0.0144
0.0562
0.0790
0.0477

We then employ the t-test analysis to test if the
password strength increase in each treatment group is
higher than zero. We find that the increase in password strength under 3 types of contextual information
are all statistically significant (t = 2.7667, p = 0.0032;
t = 3.7886, p = 0.0001; and t = 3.0906, p = 0.0012
for Time, Rank, and Probability respectively). Therefore, Hypothesis 1a is supported. Following that, we
use ANOVA to test whether the difference in password
strength increase between at least one treatment group

Password Reset

Our second variable of interest is the number of occasions where users change their password after seeing a
warning message provided by password strength meters.
As we argue earlier, this variable is particularly important to measure the effectiveness of password strength
meters but it is typically overlooked by prior studies.
Table 3 reports the numbers of times when users
change their passwords in different settings. Contextbased password strength meters also outperform the traditional password strength meter in terms of nudging
users to change passwords. The user behavior in the
Bank scenario here is also consistent with our observation in the previous section. They change passwords
much less often compared to users in the other two scenarios. We believe that this behavior is consistent with
the fact that their initial passwords are strong (e.g., they
might be confident about the strength of their initial
passwords).
For hypothesis testing, the average number of occa-

593

Table 3: The average number of occasions where
users change their password under different
scenarios and contextual warning messages

Bank
Restaurant
Forum
Total

Time
0.1220
0.1961
0.1220
0.1504

Rank
0.2182
0.3333
0.3750
0.2977

Probability
0.1277
0.2326
0.3667
0.2250

Control
0.1463
0.1111
0.0769
0.1121

Total
0.1576
0.2169
0.2267
0.1980

sions where users change their password after observing three types of the contextual information we propose
are all statistically significant (t = 3.5790, p = 0.0002;
t = 4.4163, p < 0.0001; and t = 4.3096, p < 0.0001 for
Time, Rank, and Probability respectively). Therefore,
Hypothesis 2a is statistically supported. However, as in
the case with the increase in password strength, ANOVA
reports that the difference in the average between treatment and control is significant (F = 2.4658, p = 0.0308)
but the post-hoc pairwise comparison shows that only
the difference between the Rank type and the control
group is statistically significant (t = 2.48, p = 0.032).
Hence, Hypothesis 2b is partially supported. In this
evaluation, the order of the effectiveness of our three
experimental treatments remains unchanged. Rank still
performs the best while the Time treatment remains the
worst. However, the difference between Rank and Probability treatments is shortened.

4.3

Password Generation Tips

Third, we measure the number of times users click
on the “Tips towards strong password” link and view
password generation tips. If the context-based password
strength meters can draw attentions and promote understanding among users as theorized, this would be an excellent opportunity to improve their awareness regarding
the issue of weak passwords.
The results are displayed in Table 4. Surprisingly, it
appears that users in the control group click the password generation tips more often than users in all of our
treatment groups. This finding is particularly interesting since it suggests that incorporating additional information that can promote information security awareness can be effective even for the traditional password
strength meter. As for the hypothesis testing, the average
numbers of occasions where users click “Tips towards
strong password” under three types of contextual information we provided are all significantly greater than
zero (t = 4.0963, p < 0.0001; t = 4.5506, p < 0.0001;
and t = 4.1231, p < 0.0001 for Time, Rank, and Probability respectively). Therefore, our Hypothesis 3a is
statistically supported. Meanwhile, our Hypothesis 3b
is not supported as the ANOVA analysis yields F =

0.6790, p = 0.5652. In other words, incorporating password generation tips into context-based password generation meters is significantly effective. However, the
effectiveness is at the same level as incorporating these
tips in the traditional password strength meter as the
difference in effectiveness between them is statistically
insignificant. Also, none of the difference between
three experimental treatments is statistically significant
as well.
Table 4: The average number of occasions users
click “Tips towards strong password” under
different scenarios and contextual warning
messages

Bank
Restaurant
Forum
Total

5.

Time
0.0976
0.1373
0.0976
0.1128

Rank
0.1455
0.1389
0.1250
0.1374

Probability
0.1489
0.1163
0.1000
0.1250

Control
0.1951
0.1944
0.1282
0.1724

Total
0.1467
0.1446
0.1133
0.1360

Discussions and Conclusions

Nudging users to create stronger passwords is one
important goal of information security managers and researchers. Our study shows that providing additional
contextual information along with warning messages
displayed by password strength meters could enhance
understanding among users, resulting in improved password generating behaviors. We draw theories from psychology, human-computer interaction, and warning sciences to identify potential weaknesses in the traditional
password strength meter. Following that, we conduct
a human subject study on Amazon Mechanical Turk to
test our hypotheses that adding contextual information
could enhance the effectiveness of password strength
meters. We find that the contextual information induces
users to pick stronger passwords. In addition, users
change their password more often. Furthermore, we also
find that adding a link that leads to password security
awareness training is significantly effective even in the
traditional password strength meter setting.
Our findings have implications for the use of contextual information and password strength meters to promote secure behaviors among end users and make significant contributions to the literature in behavioral information security. As most of previous works that study
password strength meters focus on understanding how
the underlying algorithm and appearance of password
strength meters affect user behavior, our work is among
the first to show that given the same algorithm and appearance, the effectiveness of the password strength meter can be significantly improved by tweaking the warn-
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ing message. Particularly, we show that adding contextual information could help improving users’ password
generating behaviors. More importantly, we measure the
effectiveness of password strength meters by both the
increase in password strength, and the increase in number of occasions users change their password after seeing the password meter, which are usually overlooked
in prior studies. In addition, we find that different types
of contextual information can affect the effectiveness of
password strength meters differently. In our study, although our three types of contextual information positively impact the effectiveness of password strength meters, only the benefits from password rank is statistically
significant. This finding is a potential future research avenue to find the optimal contextual information that can
nudge users’ password generating behavior. Theories in
psychology, human-computer interaction, and usable security, among others, could be used to draw a conceptual
framework to develop the optimal contextual information. Furthermore, we find that adding a link that leads
to password security awareness training is effective even
for the traditional password strength meter. This finding
is crucial as creating security awareness is one of the
most important parts in every security programs. Nevertheless, it is important to note that one possible reason
that the traditional password strength meter leads more
users to click the link is because they want to know more
about the reason of the assessment. Lastly, our results
are also relevant to practitioners. For one, adding contextual information to password strength meters is relatively simple. In our study, the traditional password meter calculates the probability using the Backoff Markhov
Model. We derive three types of contextual information
out of that probability by estimating the time to crack,
the rank of the password, and the number of accounts
that share the same password, which could be done without significant computation resources. Making these
minor changes to the existing password strength meter
could potentially lead to stronger passwords in general.
Our research is not without limitations. First, participants in Amazon MTurk are known to be tech-savvy,
which might bias our study. As we show earlier, passwords in this study are significantly stronger than passwords in other datasets, which might indicate that our
observations are bias. Therefore, replicating our experiment in a stricter control setting (e.g., laboratory with
student samples), or a more realistic setting (e.g., field
experiments) to validate our findings could be a great avenue for future research. Second, although we find that
“Tips towards strong password” is significantly effective
in terms of quantity (number of visits), we do not focus
on the quality part. For instance, what happened after
users click that link? Do they really read the provided

information? Can they remember the information and
apply it later? Future research which employs additional
post-test surveys to gauge participants’ understanding
before and after the study, or research that leverages a
laboratory equipped with eyes-tracking devices could be
conducted to improve our understandings.
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